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Abstract
Society’s demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to
market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent
developments in the “psychology and economics” of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend,
which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material
incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three
possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the
delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate
philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially
responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, socially responsible investment, image concerns, share-
holder value
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1 Introduction
Economists’ view of how society should be organized has traditionally rested on two pillars. The
invisible hand of the market described in Adam Smith harnesses consumers’ and corporations’
pursuit of self-interest to the pursuit of efficiency. The state corrects market failures whenever
externalities stand in the way of efficiency and redistributes income and wealth, as the income
and wealth distribution generated by markets has no reason to fit society’s moral standards. In
industrialized democracies, much of the political spectrum has converged on this division of labor,
albeit with some sharp divergences of opinion as to the relative roles of the market and the state.1
Textbook economics has thus long embraced the shareholder-value approach, which posits
that firms should be controlled by profit-maximizing shareholders while other stakeholders are
protected by contracts and regulation. Stakeholders’ insulation from managerial decisions oper-
ates through fixed nominal claims (wages and severance pay, fixed debt repayment combined with
priority and collateral, etc.) and exit options associated to general training, flexible labor markets
and short-term debt maturities. The state is supposed to step in only when satisfactory contract-
ing solutions would involve high transaction costs or require more symmetry in the information
held by the parties; cases in point include environmental taxation, antitrust, prudential regula-
tion, and the regulation of network industries. The state also controls redistributive taxation. In
a nutshell, following Pigou (1920), the state, and not citizens or firms, is in charge of correcting
market failures and income or wealth inequality.
Yet, society’s and lawmakers’ demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an
alternative response to market and redistributive failures have recently become more prominent.2
To be sure, calls for people to contribute time and money to good causes have existed throughout
history and in all societies, from Antiquity3 to, say, 18th century Quakers’ and Mennonites’
refusal to invest in weapons and slavery. But the movement is gaining momentum, especially
with the empowerment of civil society (NGOs) and the equitable-trade / responsible-investment
movement. A variety of factors probably combine to account for this trend: (i) social responsibility
is likely to be a normal good; (ii) information about companies’ practices throughout the world
has become much more accessible and quick to travel; (iii) the scope of environmental and social
externalities exerted by multinationals in less developed, more laxly regulated countries is likely
1On this last point, see Bénabou and Tirole (2006b) and Bénabou (2008a).
2For instance, according to data from the Social Investment Forum Report (2007), cited in Andries (2008), the
value of assets under management in the US that fall into the SRI category grew at annual rates of about 12% over
1995-2005 and 18% over 2005-2007; by the end of 2007, these SRI assets accounted for 11% of total assets under
professional management. Other signs of the same trend include the proliferation of fair- trade products, carbon
offsets and newly-created positions such as Corporate Sustainability Officer in many large companies.
3See, e.g., Avlonas (2009) on ancient Greece.
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to have expanded in pace with globalization; (iv) the long-run cost of atmospheric pollution (e.g.,
global warming), or at least the public’s awareness of it, has risen significantly.
Responding to such demands, business leaders, governments and academics are now also em-
phasizing the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR). A standard definition of CSR is
that it is about sacrificing profits in the social interest. For there to be a sacrifice, the firm must
go beyond its legal and contractual obligations, on a voluntary basis. CSR thereby embraces a
wide range of behaviors, such as being employee friendly, environment friendly, mindful of ethics,
respectful of communities where the firm’s plants are located, and even investor friendly. Some-
times, the call for duty extends beyond the corporation’s immediate realm and includes supporting
the arts, universities and other good causes.
Why do citizens and corporations empower themselves and substitute for elected government?
A first and clearly relevant motivation is that government may itself fail. Government failures
have multiple origins:
• Capture by lobbies and other interest groups. Governments under influence may fail to cor-
rect externalities as Pigovian principles would recommend, or bend to wealthy constituents’
opposition to redistributive policies.
• Territoriality of jurisdiction. For instance, one cannot rule against child labor in a distant,
sovereign country, and an outright import ban may be infeasible due to international trade
agreements or other policy constraints. Consumer boycotts and investor activism then
become the outlet through which citizens can express their opposition to these practices.
• A combination of inefficiency, high transaction costs, poor information and high delivery
cost. The state thus has a comparative disadvantage in policing minor nuisances such as
a lack of respect for employees or conspicuous consumption by executives, or in directing
resources to very local needs. “Appropriate” behaviors in such contexts are instead en-
forced through the pressure of social norms and popular demands that firms be socially
responsible.4
A second important motivation is that economic agents may want to promote values that
are not shared by lawmakers. Because preferences are heterogenous, it is inevitable that some
consumers, investors or workers’ values will not be fully reflected in policy. They, or organized
groups acting on their behalf, will then become activists.5
4See Shavell (2002) and Besley and Ghatak (2007). For example, the latter authors emphasize that for CSR to
be socially beneficial, corporations must be more efficient than the government at producing public goods.
5 In his review of what economics has to contribute to our understanding of CSR, Kitzmueller (2008) notes that
if ethical consumers are a minority (majority), the government may under (over) regulate.
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Despite its growing importance, little is known about the economics of individual and corpo-
rate social responsibility. This paper draws on recent developments in psychology and behavioral
economics to shed some light on the new trend, its future and its limits. It considers the benefits
and costs of socially responsible behavior (SRB), and asks whether it is a viable model for the
achievements of social goals. This work is still in the early stage and the paper can thus primarily
help us organize our thinking on these issues. Subject to this caveat, the take-home message is
that SRB holds real promise, provided we understand its motivations and limitations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses individual social responsibility, and
Section 3 corporate social responsibility. Section 4 concludes with a summary and some open
questions.
2 Individual social responsibility
Many people give to charities, invest in socially responsible funds, consume green products, supply
their blood, or give their time and sometimes even their life for good causes. Such prosocial
behaviors obey a complex mix of interdependent motivations. First, they are driven by genuine,
intrinsic altruism: to varying degrees, we all aspire to do good and help. Second, material
incentives may come into play: we are more likely to give to charities if contributions are tax
deductible. Third, we are also driven by social- and self-esteem concerns. Our conduct defines
what kind of person we are, in the eyes of others and, no less importantly, in our own. The main
focus of this section will be to identify the bright and dark sides of such image concerns, how
these interact with intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives, and the implications for public
policy.
2.1 Some evidence on image concerns
Let us make the case, if needed, that prosocial behaviors cannot be understood if one ignores
image concerns, starting with some examples in which social image plays a key role.
Anonymous donations are widely considered to be most admirable, and yet they typically
represent at most 1 % of the total number (Glazer and Konrad, 1996). The implied conclusion
that buying social prestige is part of the incentive to engage in prosocial behavior is confirmed by
several recent experiments.
A blood donation experiment in Italy awarded bronze, silver and gold “medals” for how often
people donated blood (Lacetera and Macis 2008). Such rankings had a significant effect, but only
when the results were published in newspapers. Another interesting finding of the study, which
concurs with similar ones for philanthropy in the arts and education in several countries, is that
people tend to “bunch” right above the cutoffs for each category (e.g., Buraschi and Cornelli,
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2002). In the absence of image concerns, contributions would be much more evenly spread.
A similar conclusion emerges from the introduction of mail ballots in some cantons in Switzer-
land (Funk 2008). The ability to vote by mail reduces the cost of voting, so according to standard
price theory it should increase turnout. It actually did not increase voting on average, and even
reduced participations in small communities. This supports the idea that demonstrating one’s
good citizenship to neighbors and friends is an important part of the motivation for voting, es-
pecially in small towns and villages where this behavior is more observable than in large cities.
By making no-shows less visible (creating a potential excuse), mail ballots then tend to depress
turnout in such communities. A similar effect was recently demonstrated in a field experiment on
door-to-door charitable solicitations by DellaVigna et al. (2009). When households were informed
in advanced (by a flyer on their door-knob) of the exact time when the solicitor would come by,
the fraction opening the door declined by 10 to 25 percent, and when the flyer allowed checking
a ‘Do Not Disturb’ box, giving was 30 percent lower.
Another interesting experiment focuses on volunteer firemen in Vermont (Carpenter and Myers
2007). The authors first measured subjects altruism by their willingness to share in an experimen-
tal dictator game, then related this measure to time spent in various fire-volunteering activities.
Altruism was found to make a difference for participation in training, which has a low public
visibility, but not for call response, where visibility is much higher. Conversely, having on one’s
car “vanity” license plates of a type typically associated to rescue activities (the Maltese cross)
was associated with the reverse pattern of time allocation.
Self-image concerns are also important motivators: we act prosocially in part to reassure
ourselves that we are good people.6 While this idea is familiar and intuitive, it is most cleanly
demonstrated in laboratory experiments, where anonymity (even to the experimenter, under the
double-blind procedure) ensures that social-image concerns are irrelevant.
In the standard dictator-game experiment, for instance, many subjects are willing to make at
least a small sacrifice in their own payoff to benefit others. This is prima facie evidence of the
existence of altruistic, other-regarding preferences. The real picture is more complex, however,
as a clever experiment by Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) demonstrates. As these authors show,
when given the opportunity not to know whether their actions actually hurt others, many people
take advantage of this “moral wriggle room” to make selfish choices. Their main experiment
contrasts two variants of a dictator-like game, with anonymous players. In a first, “known”
condition, subjects choose between a selfish option A that delivers 6 to them and 1 to someone
else, and a fair option B delivering 5 to each. In conformity with many previous such experiments
6See Bénabou and Tirole (2007).
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about three quarters of subjects choose B. In a second, “uncertain” condition, subjects can again
choose either 6 (option A) or 5 (option B) for themselves, but they do not know what the other
player will receive in each case. They are told only there are two versions of the game, drawn at
random with equal probabilities, which they could be playing. In version 1, the payoffs to A and
B are as above, namely (6, 1) and (5, 5), creating the same tradeoff between material gain and
generosity. In version 2, there is no tradeoff: A leads to (6, 5) and B to only (5, 1). Subjects are
also given the opportunity to find out, immediately and at no cost, which of the two versions of
the game they have randomly drawn and will be playing. According to standard decision theory,
truly generous individuals should strictly prefer to learn the state of nature, as this would allow
them to choose B in state 1 and A in state 2. Yet half of the subjects choose not to know and
proceed to select option A, presumably seizing the (false) excuse that they may not be hurting
the other. This behavior, akin to changing sidewalk not to pass by a beggar, shows how subtle
we are when we play games with ourselves. We understand (probably not even consciously) that
our memory is imperfect and that creating a “cloud of smoke” around whether one was actually
selfish can thus provide a self-excuse for our pursuing our own interests.
Other experiments, sometimes involving even more transparent self-deception, lead to similar
results and conclusions. Dana et al. (2006) thus show that many people who would voluntarily
share $10 with an anonymous other in a dictator game prefer to just take $9 for themselves and
not face that choice. In a related vein, Hamman et al. (2009) show that many subjects who
would otherwise behave generously in a dictator game will, given the opportunity, delegate the
sharing decision to a third party who has a acquired a reputation for being biased in favor of
delegating principals. Put differently, economic agents are eager to delegate the “dirty work” that
they would not want to do themselves; somehow, not directly choosing the selfish action seems to
exonerate them from what would be the logical damage to self-esteem.
All these experiments point at the idea that self-signals play an important role. Accordingly,
one would expect the cost to self-esteem incurred from selfish actions to be magnified when these
become more salient, or memorable. Indeed, Mazar et al. (2008) find that subjects who can
cheat (for money) on a task without any risk of detection, cheat less when they are first made to
read the Ten Commandments or their university’s honor code. Such reminders of moral precepts
should, according to the standard economic model, be irrelevant. In fact, by making transgression
of these precepts more salient, they reduce the ambiguity on which self-deception relies, inducing
more honest behavior.
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Figure 1: Source: Isherwood (2007)
2.2 The bright side of image concerns
From a policy perspective, the importance of image concerns offers an opportunity, as they can
cheaply be levered to increase prosocial behavior. There are numerous examples of such strategies:
• On the good-behavior side (trying to leverage honor seeking), contributors to public goods
receive public praise, medals, T-shirts, “best of” awards, and so forth. Publicity is am-
ply given for good deeds, or even bought outright (something we will come back to), as
exemplified by Figure 1.
• On the bad-behavior side (trying to leverage stigma avoidance), various modern versions
of the pillory are gaining popularity, such as internet “walls of shame” for DWI arrests or
non-payment of child support, televised arrests, and so forth.
This discussion points to a potential role of socially responsible investment, green products and
other “good-citizenship” modes of consumption and saving. When self-views are involved, we are
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very good at deception, inattention and rationalization. The main virtue of socially responsible
products and their widespread diffusion is that they provide frequent reminders of things we prefer
not to think about, such as poverty, injustice, or the environmental impact of our consumptions.7
2.3 Importance of image concerns: the darker side
There are four potential elements on the “dark side” of exploiting social and self-image motives to
spur prosocial behavior — all of which become quickly apparent when reflecting upon the nature
and content of Figure 1.
(a) The efficacy of publicizing people’s good and bad deeds is, in a sense, self-limiting. As
publicity is scaled up, people discount the meaning of prosocial acts, attributing their motivation
more to image-seeking and less to altruism. This form of “overjustification effect” implies a partial
crowding out of the incentive provided by publicity (see Bénabou and Tirole 2006a for a formal
analysis). The implication is that the more “advertised” socially responsible investments (SRI’s)
are, the more they will be discounted.
(b) Another cost relates to individuals’ choice of signals. Giving is heavily distorted toward
the more visible or memorable targets: Americans, for instance, donate substantial amounts to
Harvard, Yale, Princeton and other well-known alma maters, but far less to primary and secondary
schools. Similarly, giving to concert halls and museums has much greater “glamor” and networking
value than giving to the poor.8 A similar point applies to green investment by households: as
Ariely et al. (2009) note, buying a hybrid car or installing solar panels buys more social prestige
than insulating one’s house or buying an energy-efficient furnace. While the latter investments
are in fact more ecologically virtuous, they are also invisible to others, and after a while even to
oneself.
(c) The quest for social prestige or the enhancement of self-image is, in itself, a zero-sum game
—in the parlance of sociologists, a positional good. The buyer of a hybrid car feels and looks
better, but makes his neighbors (both buyers and non-buyers of hybrid cars) feel and look worse —
a “reputation stealing” externality. In the limit, when everyone behaves in a socially responsible
way, no one gets credit for it.
7Those reminders operate not only at the individual’s level, but also that of groups. Within firms or their boards,
in particular, SRI advocates can thus act as safeguards against overoptimistic “groupthink”, systematically asking
management to present worst-case or disaster scenarios, appointing devil’s advocates, protecting whistle-blowers,
and so on. For more on groupthink and its prevention, see Bénabou (2008b).
8At least domestically; giving to poor countries is somewhat different, in part because of different attributions
made for the causes of their poverty (see Bénabou and Tirole 2006b), and in part because such giving has much
greater visibility, as it takes place on a “global” stage.
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Figure 2: Honor and stigma. Source: Bénabou and Tirole (2006a)
Figure 2 depicts what happens when participation in a prosocial activity increases. Individuals
with intrinsic motivation (altruism) above some threshold receive the honor attached to partici-
pation, while those below it abstain and suffer stigma. When participation increases, the honor
involved decreases (prosocial behavior becomes more common) and the stigma for not participat-
ing increasing (only the “very bad apples” do so).Evidence that the quest for social prestige is
a zero-sum game (or at least is perceived to be) is provided by Monin (2007) and Monin et al.
(2008). In a series of experiments, these authors document a frequent backlash against “moral
rebels” such as vegetarians or subjects who refuse to play along in an ethically questionable sce-
nario —people who in principle should restore our faith in human nature, but in practice make us
feel morally inadequate. Outside the laboratory, moreover, such adverse reactions to “do-gooders”
are socially costly: they will be ostracized, threatened or harmed, creating a welfare loss.
(d) Our moral standards are challenged along multiple dimensions and in repeated instances.
Good behavior in one context may “justify” a more mediocre one in another, and people who
have recently “done good” in one dimension may feel immunized against negative (social or self)
inferences, and thus later on act less morally constrained. Monin and Miller (2001) document
this “moral credentializing” in experiments on gender or ethnic stereotyping: subjects who were
previously given an opportunity to make statements “demonstrating” a lack of bias against women
or minorities are, subsequently, more likely to later make a (hypothetical) decision or express an
opinion that conforms to negative stereotypes about the group in question.
2.4 Material incentives, image concerns, and policy
Economists’ standard “internalization” recommendation with respect to externalities dates back
at least to Pigou (1920): taxes on pollution or other socially harmful behaviors should equal their
net social cost; subsidies for prosocial behaviors should be set at their net social benefit. A more
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psychologically informed approach to public economics does not invalidate, but qualifies this basic
principle, which underlies so much of public policy. Indeed, there is a second externality involved,
arising from the “reputation stealing” effect discussed above. The socially optimal incentive rate
should therefore be lower than the usual Pigovian level: it must subtract from the standard
externality cost the image value implicitly “bought” by the individual or firm.
(a) Amending Pigou
This simple policy prescription raises several issues. First, image values may not always be
easy to measure, although there are implicit markets for items such as a named building, a plaque
or university chair. Second, and relatedly, one would want to know when the correction can
be significant and when it is likely to be negligible. In this respect, we have already seen that
image concerns are influenced by visibility: efficient furnaces may need to be subsidized more
than hybrid cars.
Perhaps more subtly, image concerns depend endogenously on the prevalence of the behavior
in question. Provided that the distribution of altruism in the population is unimodal (as in Figure
2), one can show (see Bénabou and Tirole 2010) that, for a given social cost of the externality,
the optimal subsidy varies non-monotonically with the proportion of people choosing the socially
responsible option: see Figure 3, which depicts this correction to Pigovian taxation. Intuitively,
“admirable” acts — those which very few individuals in society perform (or would perform without
considerable incentivization) carry substantial social prestige, and should therefore command only
modest material incentives. At the other end, “respectable” acts — those which “any decent
person” would engage in (absent exceptional constraints or inducements)— are such that failing
to perform them entails to enormous stigma; so here again, material incentives should be low.
“Modal acts”, which are neither admirable nor merely respectable, are those for which Pigovian
precepts apply best and extrinsic incentives should be strongest.
(b) Crowding out and the overjustification effect
The observation that the image value of different behaviors is endogenous (determined together
with the equilibrium behavior of the whole population) has another important implication: the
level of material incentives will affect this attribution problem, and therefore the (self) reputational
return to prosocial acts. This is illustrated in Figure 4, drawn from Bénabou and Tirole (2006a)
This figure depicts a population’s average contribution a¯ to a public good (say, donating
blood) or conformity to some socially desirable behavior, as the material reward y for doing so
(or, conversely, the penalty for failing to) increases.9 In the absence of image concerns, aggre-
9The specification of preferences underlying the figure is
U = (va + vyy)a+ μaE[va |a, y ]−C(a),
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Figure 3: Correcting Pigou’s rule. Source: Bénabou and Tirole (2010)
gate behavior conforms the representation of Homo Economicus in Econ 101: a higher reward
elicits increased supply. As image become more important, an unusual phenomenon also oc-
curs: over some interval, the supply response to incentives flattens out and, eventually, becomes
downward-sloping. This violation of basic price theory results from what psychologists call the
overjustification effect, and economists would call a signal-extraction problem. When there is no
or little reward, a prosocial act is interpreted as genuine altruism. As material incentives become
more substantial, the “meaning” of the act changes: it becomes more difficult to know to what
extent it is motivated by altruism or by greed (since people also differ along both dimensions).
The signaling value of prosocial behavior thus weakens, offsetting or even reversing the direct
effect of higher incentive. Of course, when rewards become sufficiently large, supply eventually
recovers its standard upward-sloping nature, but such levels of payments could be very costly.
Figure 4 and the more general analysis underlying it have other testable implications besides
the possibility of crowding out. First, prosocial contributions increase when their visibility, and
therefore their impact on social esteem, increase. Second, the power of incentives is weaker
(or even be negative) when image concerns are large. Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009) provide
empirical validations of these predictions. In their experiments, subjects performed tasks to earn
where va and vy parametrize an individual’s degree of altruism and marginal utility of income; a is his level of
contribution, C(a) the associated cost and y the per-unit incentive rate; finally, E[va |a, y ] is the best estimate of va
conditional on the chosen action and its reward, and μa the intensity of the image concern, common to all agents
for for simplicity. The joint distribution of va and vy is taken to be Gaussian and C(a) is quadratic. The curves
shown in Figure 4 correspond to different values of μa.
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Figure 4: The overjustification effect. Source: Bénabou and Tirole (2006a).
money for charitable causes under two conditions. In a “private” condition, only the individual
observes his effort and amount earned (only his self-image can be at stake). In the “public”
condition all subjects, and possibly some other peers, observe each person’s choices (so both self-
and social-image are involved). The first observation, which corroborates many earlier findings
(e.g., Freeman 1997), is that contributions are larger when they are public. The second one is more
striking: in conformity with the theoretical prediction, the impact of material incentives weakens
considerably (or even reverses) when they are public. Moreover, this change in slope occurs only
when the task is performed for a good cause: it is absent when it is known that subjects are
simply earning money for themselves, or for an organization most observers disapprove of. These
results are consistent with the idea that subjects in the public condition seem worried that the
presence of rewards may cause their prosocial behavior to be attributed to greed more than to
altruism. Moving beyond the laboratory, such findings provide a further rationale for subsidizing
efficient furnaces more than hybrid cars.
As we noted earlier, a second form of the overjustification effect arises from the fact that
also people differ in the intensity of their image concerns. Some are literally obsessed with social
esteem, while others care about it much less. When good deeds are very visible (by their nature
of by policy design), they will then be “discounted” as being likely to reflect a strong desire to
“buy” admiration. This discount, in turn, will dampen the signaling incentive to act prosocially,
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and this even when image seeking is not frowned upon per se —it just reduces the attribution of
good behavior to genuine altruism. This effect never fully crowds out the impact of an increase
in the publicity of actions (medals, citations, wall of shame, etc.), but can substantially dampen
it.10
Such “concerns about not looking image-concerned” resonate, as they are present in our
everyday life. Most people hesitate to boast about their good actions and would much rather
have third parties advertise these acts for them. This follows naturally from the logic of inference:
someone who brags about his good deeds signals that he is image-concerned and creates a suspicion
about the extent of his true altruism.
3 Corporate social responsibility
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is somewhat of a “catch-all” phrase for an array of different
concepts. An analysis of CSR must therefore clarify its exact meaning, and in particular the
presumed impact of CSR on the cost of capital. Some CSR advocates argue that there is a business
case for good corporate behavior, while others discuss it in terms of sacrificing some profit in the
quest for the social good. This section is, accordingly, divided into two parts. The first discusses
three alternative visions of CSR. The second discusses the challenges and opportunities faced by
the CSR movement.
3.1 Three views on CSR
(a) Vision 1: “Win-win” (“doing well by doing good”)
According to some advocates of CSR, being a good corporate citizen can also make a firm
more profitable. Since firms presumably have no interest in simultaneously reducing profits and
harming society (damaging the environment, hurting workers or consumers), for such a claim
to be more than management consultants’ promise of a “free lunch” it requires elaboration, as
well as supporting evidence. There are two ways in which it could be reasonably interpreted,
corresponding respectively to visions 1 and 2 below.
The first one involves the existence of limits to governance and managers’ temporal horizons.
As a large literature in finance has emphasized, firms often suffer from a short-term bias. This
may be due to poorly structured managerial incentives, but such biases can also result from
well-designed schemes. First, monetary incentives often put more weight on short-term than on
long-term performance. Although the recent crisis has brought more widespread recognition of
the hazards which short-term-oriented compensation schemes create for corporations and society,
some dependence on current or recent firm performance is inevitable. Second, decisions by boards
10See Bénabou and Tirole (2006a).
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and shareholders of whether to keep current management, change it or alter the scope of its
activities are also necessarily based in part on recent observation (even if some of the long-term
impact of managers’ actions may filter through long-term indicators such as the stock price.11).
Thus, career concerns also generate some short-term biases.
In practice, short-termism often implies both an intertemporal loss of profit and an externality
on stakeholders. That is, managers take decisions that increase short-term profit, but reduce
shareholder value and hurt workers or other constituencies. For example, a firm may renege on
an implicit contract with its labor or suppliers so as to reduce costs, thereby damaging goodwill
—making it more difficult to attract motivated workers in the future, or to induce suppliers to
make relationship-specific investments (e.g., Krueger and Mas 2004). Alternatively, a firm could
economize on safety or pollution control; this also increases short-run profits, but creates con-
tingent liabilities down the road: risk of future lawsuits, consumer boycotts and environmental
cleanup costs. In such cases, the “win-win” argument makes clear sense.
The upshot is that, in this first vision, CSR is about taking a long-term perspective to max-
imizing (intertemporal) profits. This suggests that socially responsible investors should position
themselves as long-term investors who monitor management and exert voice to correct short-
termism.
In the same vein, but with much more ambiguous welfare consequences, “strategic CSR” (to
use a term coined by Baron 2001) consists in taking a socially responsible stance in order to
strengthen one’s market position and thereby increase long-term profits. For instance, CSR could
be a means of placating regulators and public opinion to avoid strict supervision in the future, or
to attempt raising rivals’ cost by encouraging environmental, labor or safety regulations that will
particularly handicap competitors.
(b) Vision 2: Delegated philanthropy (the firm as a channel for the expression of citizen values)
For the reasons discussed in Section 2, some stakeholders (investors, customers, employees)
are often willing to sacrifice money (yield, purchasing power and wage, respectively) so as to
further social goals. Put differently, stakeholders have some demand for corporations to engage
in philanthropy on their behalf. The corresponding CSR profit sacrifice is then passed through to
stakeholders at their demand.
Note that one needs to explain why people would want corporations to do good on their behalf,
rather than doing it on their own or through charitable organizations, churches, etc. Information
and transaction costs are clearly important here. In theory, consumers could send money to
directly supplement the income of workers in the coffee plantations supplying Starbucks. But
11On this point, see e.g., Holmström and Tirole (1993).
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they would have to be informed about the occurrence of individual trades and contracts and their
financial transfers would involve enormous transaction costs. Somehow, philanthropy must thus
be delegated. It could perhaps be entrusted to some charitable organization, but transaction
costs are still likely to be much lower if delegation goes through the corporation, which already is
involved in a financial relationship with the workers.
Another argument for asking corporations to behave pro-socially is that the desired actions are
often not about transferring income to less-favored populations, but about refraining from specific
behaviors, such as polluting the environment; here there is no substitute for asking the firm to
behave well when the state does not impose constraining regulations. A related case is when a
firm draws on its technical expertise or exploits complementarities to deliver goods and services
to those in need more efficiently than the governments or other philanthropic “intermediaries”
could. Examples include a giant supermarket chain organizing relief convoys to a zone hit by a
hurricane, or a large water-treatment utility setting up a program of digging water wells for poor,
remote villages in a developing country.
Many examples come to mind: Starbucks increases its demand by buying fair trade coffee and
tea. Other firms advertise heavily that their clothing is made from organic cotton, or the product
of fair trade. Some corporations provide incentives for employee engagement in community service,
thereby boosting public relations with the local communities and attracting motivated employees
(Besley and Ghatak 2005, Brekke and Nyborg 2008). The view that corporations engage in socially
responsible behavior (SRB) on behalf of stakeholders is also supported by the observation that
“sin stocks” (tobacco, alcohol, casinos) exhibit higher returns (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009).12 On
the other hand, and as we will later discuss, other empirical research fails to demonstrate a link
between CSR behavior and a lack of profitability.
The idea that firms exercising CSR are responding to consumer and investor demand that
they “do good” on their behalf is consistent with the greater prevalence of such practices among
firms that are large, profitable, produce final goods and are scrutinized by NGOs. Visibility with
respect to stakeholders demanding SRB thus incentivizes firms to engage in such behavior.13
As with individuals, the image concerns of corporations also have their darker side, taking
here the form of “greenwash: disseminating a misleading picture of environmental friendliness or
other SRB, or one that is accurate in some dimensions but serves to obscure less savory ones.
Thus, Enron was a huge corporate giver, particularly to the Houston area, and one of the most
impressive “glossy brochures” documenting the multiple facets of a firm’s CSR benevolence is the
12A similar conclusion is reached by Geczy et al (2005).
13Of course, NGO scrutiny is itself endogenous.
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one issued in 2007 by AIG.14
Vision 2 of CSR does not raise any specific corporate governance issue: management caters to
demand and maximizes profit. As with the long-term perspective, profit maximization and CRS
are consistent.
(c) Vision 3: Insider-initiated corporate philanthropy
In this interpretation of CSR, corporate prosocial behavior is (at least in part) not motivated
by stakeholders’ demands or willingness to sacrifice money for a good cause, but rather reflects
management’s or the board members’ own desires to engage in philanthropy. For instance, corpo-
rations often give to charities on the boards of which their executives or own board members sit,
or to institutions (concert halls, opera houses, museums) and causes (e.g., political thinktanks)
which their top management favors.15 Profit is then typically not maximized.
This type of philanthropy has come under attack from both the right and left sides of the polit-
ical spectrum. In a well-known piece, Milton Friedman (1970) wrote in essence that corporations
should not do charity with others’ money. Rather, managers and directors should employ their
own wealth to this purpose. On the other side of the aisle, Robert Reich has argued that there
is no way to ensure that private money will go to the “right” causes and that firms should not
substitute for the state (meaning, presumably, that elections provide the legitimacy to define what
is “right”). In practice, the state restricts the set of potential recipients of corporate generosity
by deciding which institutions are eligible for tax-deductible contributions. So, while it has very
imperfect control over the allocation, it at least keeps control over the identity of recipients.
Unlike the citizen-delegation view, the view of corporate philanthropy as management-initiated
raises substantial corporate governance issues. Indeed, if investors simply demand the highest
possible return (implying no tolerance for SRB if they do not benefit from it), managers and the
board must be somewhat entrenched in order to be able to practice corporate philanthropy on
a large scale (Cespa and Cestone 2007). The notion of a broader mission of management than
just maximizing shareholder value necessarily involves some cost to corporations, making it more
difficult for them to raise funds from investors.16 It may also weaken managerial accountability by
creating multiple objectives and performance criteria; at the extreme, too many missions amount
to no mission at all (Dewatripont et al. 1999).
14See American International Group, Inc. (2007), p. 4-5.
15Among other instances, Jennings (2006) relates that “from 1992 to 2002, while Dennis Koslowski served as
CEO, Tyco gave 35 million to charities designated by Mr. Koslowski... Mr. Koslowski served on the board of the
Whitney Museum of American Art, and, as a result Tyco donated 4.5 million to the travelling museum shows that
Whitney sponsored.”
16 It is interesting to note that this notion is more popular in civil-law countries, which put more emphasis on
stakeholder participation in governance and a broader duty of firms to society than in common-law countries, where
shareholder value has primacy.
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In practice, the dividing line between the different notions of CSR —long-term perspective
(vision 1, delegated philanthropy (vision 2) and profit-sacrificing insiders’ philanthropy (vision 3)
may be elusive. Consider, for instance, the increasingly popular practices of nominating someone
with a good external reputation as a Corporate Sustainability Officer, or of turning to reputable
NGOs for advice and help. Do firms hire a Corporate Sustainability Officer to serve as an advocate
against short-termism —a kind of environmental risk manager, in effect— within the firm? Or is this
executive meant to be a voice for costly prosocial behavior demanded by stakeholders? Similarly,
consider the introduction of monetary incentives based on environmental performance. Are they
meant, say, to encourage divisional managers to install carbon-free equipment that are currently
unprofitable due to the world’s lax attitude toward climate change, but will reduce future costs
when carbon dioxide is taxed at a more reasonable level? Or is a genuine desire to do good a
better interpretation of green incentives than the long-term perspective view? In the latter case,
are these “green incentives” the object of intense communication to shareholders (suggesting vision
2) or a confidential policy (suggesting vision 3)?
In sum, we see that, as with individual consumers and investors, corporate “socially responsible
behaviors” often carry much ambiguity as to their exact motivation.
(d) Do the data help us tell these theories apart?
Empirical studies often relate corporate profitability with socially responsible behavior.17
There seems to be, overall, no or a slightly positive correlation between socially responsible be-
havior and corporate returns (see Orlitzky et al. 2003, Margolis and Elfenbein 2007 and Margolis
et al. 2007 for meta-analyses, Heal 2005 and Reinhardt et al. 2008 for further discussions). The
interpretation of empirical analyses is, however, subject to three difficulties.
The first one concerns which CSR theory is being tested. We observed that visions 1 and 2
both predict a positive correlation between CSR and profits,18 while vision 3 predicts the reverse.
In practice, CSR is likely to involve a mix of all three across the corporate sample, so it is unclear
what specific channel is being tested.
The second difficulty pertains to the empirical strategy. On the causal-inference front, SRB
and profitability are clearly both endogenous variables, raising the usual issue of what are the
exogenous drivers (equivalently, what would be appropriate instruments) underlying the observed
correlation patterns. If managers differ exogenously in their individual time horizons, for instance,
17A recent entry in this literature is Krüger (2009), who conducts event studies upon the announcement of
ratings by KLD Research & Analytics, a firm that provides environmental, social and governance (ESG) research
for institutional investors. Stock prices fall on average by 1% within a week following a negative announcement.
On the other hand, there does not seem to be an abnormal return after a positive announcement.
18At least up to a point. Barnea and Rubin (2006) argue that small amounts of CSR expenditures will raise
profitability, while larger amounts will not.
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a positive correlation is to be expected (from vision 1). If they differ in the private value they
derive from being associated with a firm known to act well toward its employees, consumers or
the environment, then (from vision 3), one might expect a negative relationship. There could also
be reverse causation, for instance if the most profitable firms are the best able to afford the cost
of CSR or, as suggested by Margolis et al. (2007, 2009), have the most incentive to engage in it.19
An empirical strategy must also choose between operating performance and stock-market
returns to measure “corporate returns”. Both involve different problems. For operating perfor-
mance (e.g. Return on Assets), the empirical challenge is the following: if one believes that CSR
increases the mean profit by limiting rare disasters (vision 1), one needs very large samples to see
that significantly in the data. Most studies look instead at stock returns. This raises the issue
of whether CSR companies have different systematic risk exposures (either due to their resilience
in periods of crisis or because they face a specific CSR risk factor), in which case they command
different risk premia, and therefore have different expected returns. As Andries (2008) notes,
“New laws and regulations are typically introduced when things go wrong. . . Socially responsible
investors would simply be the ones with higher risk aversion to a deterioration of the “state of
the world””.
Another issue is whether financial markets are still learning about CSR. Some people have in
mind (implicitly or explicitly) that the stock market has been undervaluing the “true importance”
of CSR, so that virtuous companies have positive abnormal returns (they keep surprising the mar-
ket positively, in contradiction to market efficiency). An intermediate story is a “slow repricing”,
whereby environmental and social factors are gradually becoming recognized as relevant price fac-
tors for valuing a company; virtuous firms experience high returns during this recognition period,
but should experience lower ones once the repricing is completed.
The third unknown involves extrapolation. Socially responsible investment has, so far, mostly
been a marginal phenomenon, and there is no reason why profitability should remain the same as
its prevalence increases. A key issue here is which types of socially responsible activities involve
decreasing or, conversely, increasing. returns. For instance, a small number of environmentally
concerned investors can always invest in the existing clean companies; it is therefore likely that
CSR has had little impact on stock prices in the past. As SRI popularity increases, other firms
may have to start incurring higher abatement costs in order to attract funding, depressing yields.20
Consistent with this idea of an increasing CSR discount, Andries (2008) finds, in the cross-section
19 In his descriptive statistics, Krüger (2009) finds that “irresponsible companies” —defined as those for which
KLD records more events of bad behavior — tend to have been less profitable in the past than responsible ones.
20 In the long run, however, certain technologies (e.g., clean power more likely than reforestation) may benefit
from economies of scale and learning-by-doing, bringing costs back down and yields up.
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of S&P 500 firms and after controlling for industry and firm characteristics: (i) no significant
relationship between asset returns and CSR over the 1991-2006 period; (ii) an emerging negative
relationship for some criteria related to negative screening (tobacco, alcohol, gambling, nuclear
power) over the more recent 2000-2006 period.
3.2 Challenges for delegated philanthropy
This section focuses on what may be the fastest-growing form of SRB (at least in terms of visibil-
ity), delegated philanthropy, and discusses some of the challenges ahead. Delegated philanthropy,
as we noted, is a response to a widespread demand by stakeholders that firms they interact with
be good corporate citizens. While it does not call into question traditional forms of governance, it
does faces serious practical challenges, which will need to be confronted head on if this approach
to CSR is to realize its full potential.
(a) Free riding
Socially responsible investment, the fair trade movement, and the desire to be employed by a
socially responsible institution all involve a private provision of a public good. The temptation
to free ride is substantial. We may be willing to pay our electricity 5% more if it is carbon-free,
to sacrifice a bit on the yield on our savings, or to be paid a little less in order to feel good
about our employer. But there are limits to such sacrifices. While people almost unanimously
declare themselves willing to incur costs to improve the environment or promote development,
attitudes change when things become more concrete. According to recent polls, 65% of the French
people are opposed to the current, modest carbon tax, which they and all the candidates had
embraced during the presidential campaign two years ago as a desirable national contribution to
the reduction of global warming. It would be interesting to know how free riding will evolve if
SRI becomes very popular and if this, through decreasing returns, significantly reduces the yield
on socially responsible funds.
(b) Information
In order to choose a company to invest in, buy from or work for, investors, consumers and
workers need information as to whether it really behaves prosocially. This raises three challenges:
• Data collection is itself a public good. It is therefore important that specialized rating
agencies supply the required information to the public. Of course, these agencies may face
inadequate incentives, as was demonstrated in the recent financial crisis, and there is ground
to be vigilant. But the problem of reporting is not specific to this context, and we have to
make with the need for delegation.
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• Different dimensions of good corporate citizenship need to be aggregated. Firms do well in
some dimensions and poorly on others, so one of the challenges facing rating agencies is to
find a methodology for adding then up into a synthetic index (or a small number thereof).
How does one assess the closure of a plant that emits a lot of CO2, but provides jobs to a
local community? Does one view nuclear power in terms of its definitely favorable impact
against global warming, or of its long-lasting hazardous waste? Can a multinational offset
some local environmental damage by financing a school, clinic or waste-treatment facility
in the community?
• Should corporate social performance be assessed in absolute or relative terms? For example,
an oil company may pollute a lot, but make substantial efforts to reduce its pollution and
be “best in class”. Relatedly, Landier and Nair (2008) have suggested including relative
performance within the industry as a criterion for delineating socially responsible portfolios.
(c) Defining what is socially responsible
CSR inherits the strengths and weaknesses of the democratic process. As is well-known,
politicians often tend to follow public opinion in order to pander to the electorate.21 Good public
policy is therefore often conditioned by a proper understanding, or at least a lack of prejudice by
voters in the relevant matter. A case in point is environmental policy. European politicians may
impose a cost of over 1,000 Euros to economize one ton of carbon by subsidizing solar panels (most
cost estimates range from 600 to 1,400 Euros), when they could have economized over 50 tons
with the same money by buying out the carbon rights (the price of a ton in the EU’s Emissions
Trading System at the date of this writing is 15 euros). But, due to poor information or an
imperfect understanding of the economics of the matter, or again the bias toward more visible,
“symbolic” interventions introduced by voters’ identity concerns, there is no electoral sanction,
but actually an increase in popularity, attached to such moves.
Similarly, the challenge for a proper assessment of which firms are socially responsible is to
disincentivize rating agencies and CEO’s from pandering to their constituencies’ (investors, con-
sumers workers) biases. The same problem arises in many contexts. NGOs reselling confiscated
ivory will be frowned upon by the public for behaving “immorally”, even when this move lowers
the price of ivory and thereby discourages poachers. A polluter may still be frowned upon after a
tax on the pollutant is imposed at its Pigovian level (the polluter is then subject to “double tax-
ation”). Regardless of their own attitude toward genetically modified organisms (GMO’s), most
experts would admit that popular attitudes on the subject are often driven by rather unscientific
21See, e.g., Maskin and Tirole (2004).
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arguments and based on little information. Finally, framing is bound to distort assessments: the
choice of presenting a firm’s rationale for locating a plant in a low-labor-cost country as “helping
a poor country to develop” or “minimizing labor cost” is obviously not neutral.
(d) What kind of activism?
A much debated question for green or ethic funds is the nature of their action. Should they
intervene in governance or more passively vote with their feet? In the latter case, should the fund
engage in a dialog with the firm before excluding it from its portfolio?
Typically, green or ethic funds are informed (by lobbies, some multilateral organizations, etc.)
of an “incident”, i.e. a firm’s potential misbehavior. The fund then “monitors” and enters a
“dialog” or “engagement” with the firm to persuade it to alter its behavior, threatening a boycott
if it does not comply. Some funds and NGOs prefer a “clean-hands” approach that does not involve
any such dialog, by fear of being seen as soft on the infringer or of being led to a compromise that
does not satisfy the socially responsible investors.
Another debate relates to the choice between positive and negative screening. Negative screen-
ing refers to the exclusion of unrepentant firms; positive screening consists in investing only in
“best-in-class” corporations.
A third debate concerns whether the name of companies facing engagement, and not only those
which end up excluded, should be published. There may be a good argument for not disclosing
the names of firms involved in negotiations, so as to give them more of an incentive to alter their
behavior. On the other hand, this may increase the risk of collusion or capture of the NGO or
fund involved.
4 Concluding thoughts
While the invisible hand of the market and the more visible one of the state have been the
objects of much research, we still know little about the decentralized correction of externalities
and inequality.
This paper has argued that there are three possible understandings of corporate social respon-
sibility: the adoption of a more long-term perspective, the delegated exercise of philanthropy on
behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. The latter two understand-
ings build on individual social responsibility, which led us to review individual motivations for
prosocial behavior. We saw that prosocial behavior by investors, consumers and workers is driven
by a complex set of motives: intrinsic altruism, material incentives (defined by law and taxes)
and social- or self-esteem concerns. These three motives are mutually interdependent, and both
policymakers and social activists must have a good understanding of these interactions in order
to properly harness people’s desire to behave prosocially.
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We thus saw that the importance of social and self signaling concerns provides a powerful and
cheap lever for certain types of interventions (up to a point) but makes others counterproductive,
and that the pursuit of social and self esteem per se is a zero-sum game distorting actions towards
the more visible.
While we have focused a fair amount of attention on image concerns, other “behavioral” aspects
should also be added to the picture in order to augment our understanding of giving patterns. As
with other choices such as retirement savings, default options (e.g., having to opt in or out) will
be relevant, if only because they convey information as to what is expected by society. Should
carbon offsets be included in airplane tickets with an opt-out option? Should a fixed percentage of
paychecks be allocated to charities by default, or some fraction of 401(k) contribution directed to
socially responsible funds, again with an opt-out option? Another interesting question is whether
prosocial behavior is, like exercise and good hygiene, habit forming. Presumably, a belief in such
virtuous habit formation underlies “compulsory volunteering” as prerequisite for most college
admissions in the United States.
Research should obviously tackle another fundamental question: who, among the state, stake-
holders and firms, is best placed to address market failures and inequality? Are their actions
complement or substitutes? Could Public-Private-Parnerships maintain public involvement while
harnessing private sector resources, efficiency and validation?
In this paper we purposely offered a somewhat cautious view of SRI and CSR, but our choice
to work on this topic should be interpreted as a sign of optimism. Caring about the environment,
the welfare of people in poor countries, and other good causes is a normal good. The richer our
societies, the higher the demand for SRB. But one needs to lever altruism and signaling concerns
in the right way, and this requires a good understanding of the psychology of giving and how it
interacts with markets and other general-equilbrium forces. Economists, guided by the hands of
Pigou and Smith, have so far paid insufficient attention to this topic. We hope that this paper,
despite its modest scope, will encourage more research on this topic.
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